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Airport Searches of Suspected Currency
Law Violators
United States v. Duncan
693 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1982)
In 1980, a United States citizen was convicted in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California for making a false
statement to customs officials regarding the amount of currency he
intended to take out of the country.' The defendant filed a pre-
trial suppression motion challenging his arrest on Constitutional
grounds. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant ap-
pealed, claiming that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001' was
improper under the wording of the statute, and alleging that the
customs officers' stop and search at the airport violated both his
fourth and fifth amendment rights2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed: 1) defendant's false
statement in response to the agents' questions was material within
the meaning of § 1001; 2) the agents' stop and search at the airport
without a warrant was nevertheless valid as a "border search"; and
3) the agents' failure to give the defendant his Miranda warnings
before elicting an inculpatory remark was harmless error as there
was already sufficient independent evidence of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971 (9th Cir.
1982).
On April 3, 1980, three U.S. Customs Special Agents stopped
and questioned defendant, Don Duncan, as he was about to board
an international flight from Los Angeles to Bogota, Colombia. The
agents were ostensibly assigned to the airport to ensure the passen-
gers' compliance with federal currency regulations.
1. The district court's opinion is not reported.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides: Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or cov-
ers up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraud-
ulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document know-
ing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. v.,
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Duncan matched a narcotics/currency violation profile used by
Customs agents to identify potential violators. Agreeing amongst
themselves that Duncan looked suspicious, the agents identified
themselves to him, led him away from the other passengers, and
asked him whether he had anything to report to Customs. Duncan
indicated that he was aware of the five thousand dollar ($5000)
limit on unreported currency which may be removed from the
country' and admitted that he was carrying exactly that amount.
After voluntarily producing the five thousand dollars, Duncan con-
sented to a pat-down search which led to the discovery of another
five thousand dollars in his back pocket.
When questioned as to why he had not reported the overage to
Customs, Duncan replied that he had failed to report the money
on his income tax return and feared that Customs would alert the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). When they had completed their
search, the agents had recovered over twenty-one thousand dollars
from his wallet, money belt, and pockets. The agents seized the
money and gave Duncan his Miranda warnings.5
The court of appeals first considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 1001
encompassed Duncan's statement to the agents that he was carry-
ing the statutory amount. Concluding that it did, the court decided
that the defendant's willfully falsified statement was indeed
material.6
The Ninth Circuit relied on U.S. v. Carrier,7 which addressed
this question in a strikingly similar factual setting. Carrier applied
a two-part test to determine whether a statement was "material"
within the meaning of § 1001. First, the court asked whether the
falsification affected the exercise of a governmental function; and
second, whether the statement tended to influence an agency deci-
4. Duncan at 974; § 1101(a) provides: Except as provided in subsection (c) of this sec-
tion, whoever, whether as principal, agent, or bailee, or by any agent or bailee, knowingly-
(1) transports or causes to be transported monetary instruments-
(A) from any place within the United States to or through any place
outside the United States, or
(B) to any place within the United States from or through any place
outside the United States, or
(2) receives monetary instruments at the termination of their transportation
to the United States from or through any place outside the United States-
in an amount exceeding $5000 on any one occasion shall file a report or reports in accor-
dance with subsection (b) of this section.
5. 693 F.2d at 974.
6. Id. at 975.
7. 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981).
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sion.5 Since a false "no" would tend to prevent Customs from ful-
filling its duties, the court in Carrier reasoned that both elements
of the test had been met. Thus, the court of appeals concluded
that Duncan's statements formed the basis of a § 1001 conviction.9
The court next considered whether the agents' questioning in-
fringed Duncan's right against self-incrimination. In the past, it
has been held, that where a truthful response will cause one to in-
criminate oneself, one is permitted to simply state an "exculpatory
no," which will not be held against him.10 In the case at bar, for
instance, if Duncan had answered the Customs agent's question
truthfully, it would have incriminated him for having violated
§ 1101.
Again, the court looked to recent case law. In U.S. v. Moore,"
the Ninth Circuit sidestepped application of the "exculpatory no"
exception because defendant Moore had not only answered "no" to
a government agent's inquiry, but had also made affirmative state-
ments inculpating himself. In the instant case, Duncan likewise an-
swered affirmatively, confirming that he knew of the reporting re-
quirments but was not in violation of them. Therefore, the Duncan
court reasoned that the exception did not apply."
Next, the court examined the agents' authority to conduct a
warrantless stop and search of Duncan. The court founded its deci-
sion on an analysis of two issues: (1) whether or not the search was
valid as a border search and, (2) if so, whether the search was
reasonable.
Relying on U.S. v. Stanley" and California Bankers Assn. v.
Schultz, 4 the Ninth Circuit held that a person leaving the country
may be stopped and searched without suspicion or probable cause,
"pursuant to border principles." 5 These principles, as articulated
in U.S. v. Ramsey,'6 explain that the longstanding right of the sov-
ereign to protect itself justifies warrantless border searches. Subse-
quent cases have held that such border searches are consistent
8. Id. at 561-62.
9. 693 F.2d at 976.
10. Id.; see U.S. v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1974), which reversed a case for the
defendant based on this exception.
11. 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980).
12. 693 F.2d at 976.
13. 545 F.2d 661, 661-67 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 436 U.S. 917 (1978).
14. 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974).
15. 693 F.2d at 977.
16. 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
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with the fourth amendment. 17
The court acknowledged that the Customs agents had per-
formed a border search because an international airport is the
functional equivalent of a border. 18 It is enough, the court rea-
soned, that the passenger intend to leave the country and that the
search occur in reasonable proximity to the departure. "
The court then turned to the reasonableness of the search,
noting that the agents initially asked only for Duncan's consent to
a pat-down. He was not asked to remove his sweater or money belt
until more than five thousand dollars was discovered. Not only was
the manner of the search not unusual, but it was out of the public
view, and therefore, neither humiliating nor embarrasing to
Duncan. Further, Duncan had constructive notice that he might be
searched; it was not necessary that he be warned explicitly since an
airport search might reasonably be anticipated. ° Finding no im-
propriety, the court concluded that the agents' conduct comported
with the border search exception to the warrant requirement.
Finally, the court of appeals addressed the agents' failure to
give Duncan Miranda warnings, holding that, in the Ninth Circuit,
Miranda warnings need not be given in border searches until the
agents have probable cause to believe that the person questioned
has committed an offense. 21
The court reasoned that no Miranda warnings were needed
when Duncan made his initial statement since the agents had
probable cause to believe that he committed an offense. However,
after the agents discovered the second five thousand dollars, they
had probable cause to believe that Duncan violated either 31
U.S.C. § 10582 or 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Although Miranda warnings should have been given at that
point, the court ruled that the ommission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Duncan's second statement, referring to the IRS,
was not necessary to convict him since his first statement, coupled
17. See also U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 549 (1976).
18. 693 F.2d at 977.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 978.
21. Id. at 979; see also U.S. v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1980); U.S.
v. Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1980).
22. 31 U.S. § 1058 provides: Whoever willfully violates any provision of this chapter or
any regulation under this chapter shall be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both. Compare note 2, supra.
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with the cash found on him, was sufficient independent evidence of
guilt.23
Circuit Judge Fletcher's dissent took exception to the major-
ity's finding that Duncan's stop and search was legal. The dissent-
ing judge denied that there was any authority, statutory or other-
wise, for the "border search exception." The majority's reliance on
Ramsey was misplaced, he argued, since that case addressed bor-
der searches of persons entering, rather than leaving, the country.
2 4
The judge supported his position by citing 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a),
2
5
which provides that a court must issue a warrant to search some-
one suspected of violating § 1101.
The dissent also called the court's attention to U.S. v.
Bedore,26 which held that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was not intended to
embrace oral, unsworn statements unless such statements would
substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law to the
particular agency27 The Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Gilliland,2
claimed that § 1001, as envisioned by the Secretary of the Interior,
had been designed to apply only to false and fraudulent papers
rather than oral statements.
Even if Duncan did not come within the purview of § 1001
sanctions, the dissent concedes that prosecution under 31 U.S.C.
§ 1058 would be appropriate. 2 ' The only difference between the
two sections is the penalty prescribed for violating the reporting
statute.
Duncan is significant because it affirms the government's au-
thority to search anyone about to leave the country on less than
probable cause and without first giving Miranda warnings. In this
respect, the case extends the "protection principle" of Ramsey to
border searches of passengers leaving, as well as entering, the
23. 693 F.2d at 979.
24. Id. at 981 n. 2.
25. Section 1105(a) provides that: If the Secretary [of the Treasury] has reason to be-
lieve that monetary instruments are in the process of transportation and with respect to
which a report filed under section 1101 of this title [requiring disclosure of currency in ex-
cess of $5000] has not been filed or contains material omissions or misstatements, he may
apply to any court of competant jurisdiction for a search warrant. Upon a showing of proba-
ble cause, the court may issue a warrant authorizing the search of . . . (1) One or more
designated persons.
26. 455 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972).
27. 693 F.2d at 985.
28. 312 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1941).
29. 693 F.2d at 985; see note 21, supra.
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country. The Ninth Circuit refused to rule on whether Duncan
could have taken advantage of the "exculpatory no" exception had
his first statement been a simple "no." This open issue, and the
objections raised by the dissent, are certain to recur in future
cases.
ROBERT J. SLOTKIN
